Responding to trust breaches: The domain specificity of trust and the role of affect

Chao C. Chen*, Patrick Saparito and Liuba Belkin

Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, USA; Saint Joseph’s University, USA; Lehigh University, College of Business and Economics, USA

(Received 7 February 2010; final version received 28 November 2010)

Trust researchers have called for additional work examining trust breaches and trust erosion, as well as an explicit inclusion of affect in trust models. This paper directly responds to these calls. Based on a critical analysis and extension of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman's (1995) integrative trust model, we examine the relative amount of positive affect associated with each dimension of trustworthiness (i.e., ability, integrity and benevolence). We further explore how breaches of different trustworthiness expectations for a particular joint activity influence trust erosion of the overall relationship. Finally, we identify specific negative emotions that mediate trust breaches and trust erosion.

Keywords: affect; trust breach; trust erosion; trust domain specificity; trustworthiness

Over the past decade, a groundswell of research has identified trust as an essential element to social exchange, economic processes and organisational effectiveness (McAllister, 1995; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). This research has helped scholars to understand important antecedents and outcomes to trust (Butler, 1991; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001), different bases of trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004), and a distinction between trust and trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McEvily et al., 2003). We seek to contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, while important research has examined how trust can be built or repaired (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Williams, 2001; 2007), there is a paucity of research on the nature and attributes of trust breaks and erosion. However, as Schoorman et al. (2007, p. 349) point out, ‘in order to repair trust, it is critical to first understand how it was damaged in the first place, since different means of damaging trust are likely to require different reparative response’. This paper helps to fill the gap by focusing on how affective reactions to a trust breach influence trust erosion.

Additionally, past trust research has predominantly followed a cognitive approach to trust development and decline, treating it as an information-processing and risk-assessment process, from which an individual makes a decision on whether to increase or decrease trust (Schoorman et al., 2007). Nevertheless, there is a

*Corresponding author. Email: chaochen@rutgers.edu
growing interest in affect’s role in trust relationships as scholars come to understand that without accounting for affective processes, we cannot hope to understand fully the dynamics of interpersonal trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Jones & George, 1998; McAllister, 1995; Williams, 2001; 2007). This research led Schoorman and colleagues (2007: 349) to acknowledge that studying the role of emotions can ‘add a new dimension’ to the seminal trust model proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995). In this paper, we assess the affective content of Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) trustworthiness dimensions and analyse how breaching positive expectations of different trustworthiness dimensions can lead to different levels and types of negative emotion, which in turn affect trust erosion and trust reparability.

Third, we adopt a situational approach that explores trust of a partner in a specific ‘social situation’ (Jones & George, 1998), or ‘joint activity’ (Lawler, 2001) as opposed to trust of a partner in a total relationship spanning different situations and activities (Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007). The total relationship approach to trust has been criticised as too rigid to capture the multifaceted and often compartmentalised reality of human relations in contemporary life (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). The situational approach we propose distinguishes trustworthiness assessments and trust decisions with regard to specific joint activities from those with regard to the overall relationship of the two parties. Furthermore, we assert that trusting a partner for a given activity can and does occur without the full and complete assurance of all trustworthiness dimensions such as ability, integrity and benevolence. We also argue that each trustworthiness dimension, be it ability, integrity or benevolence, is in itself domain specific, that is, for example, one can be trusted on the basis of integrity trustworthiness in private but not in public matters. Such a situational and episodic approach in our view provides an important critique of and an extension to the integrative model of organisational trust proposed by Mayer and colleagues (Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2007). It allows us to analyse and compare the amount of affect in different bases of trust (i.e. dimensions of trustworthiness) and to examine the dynamics of affective responses to trust breaches that violate different trustworthiness expectations.

In the following, we first review and clarify the foundations and assumptions of trust and trustworthiness by articulating the meanings of domain specific trust. We then present an affective model where we look at the relative amount of affect associated with each type of trustworthiness and its role in responding to trust breaches, which in turn influences trust erosion and trust reparability.

Foundations and assumptions of trust and trustworthiness

**Trust and trustworthiness**

A review of the trust literature shows broad consensus on two general components (Rousseau et al., 1998): willingness to be vulnerable and positive expectations. Vulnerability refers to the risk of loss, should one party place its welfare in the hands of another (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Mayer et al., 1995). Positive expectations refer to a party’s confident beliefs that another will behave in a beneficial manner. These expectations represent a psychological state that is a property of the party placing the trust in another (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). In contrast, trustworthiness is an attribute of the trustee implying that he or she is worthy of
being trusted (Barney & Hansen, 1994; McEvily et al., 2003). Mayer and colleagues (1995) further developed a parsimonious set of trustworthiness dimensions, namely, ability, integrity and benevolence, which constitute a foundation for trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Ability refers to an individual’s skills, competencies and other task-related characteristics. Integrity refers to behaviours and actions in adherence to a set of principles and values acceptable to the specific parties involved, but may not necessarily be perceived as acceptable to society as a whole. Finally, benevolence refers to the extent to which the trustee has genuine personal care and concern for the trustor and ‘is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an ego-centric profit motive’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 718). Benevolence is reflected in Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) discussion of the development of a deeper sense of identity between interacting parties, which fosters expectations about the ‘goodwill of others and an understanding of constraints on the relationship’ (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994, p. 100).

The key difference between trustworthiness and trust as proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995) is that the former pertains to the characteristic of the trustee, albeit through the perception of the trustor, while the latter is a psychological state of the trustor. Therefore, perceived trustworthiness is a key antecedent of trust in Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) integrative model that includes other variables, such as an individual’s trust propensity and the perceived situational risk. Trust propensity is a personality difference that orients some individuals to be generally more trusting than others. The distinctions between trust and trust propensity on one hand and trust and trustworthiness on the other represent a major advancement in the theorisation of trust, as it allows researchers to investigate antecedents of trust other than personality of the trustor. Additionally, it opens the door for studying the more complex dynamics of domain-specific trusting attitudes and behaviours. However, as we will explain in the following sections, in order for Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model to guide domain specific research, more conceptual clarification and expansion are needed.

**Challenges of contemporary relationships for trust research**

In their review of trust theories and research, Lewicki and colleagues (1998) presented three critical comments on what they called the old, traditional view of trust and relationships: (1) limited attention to the context and the social dynamics of relationships; (2) focus on the overall level of total trust; and (3) emphasis on relationship consistency and balance. The authors asserted that such views of relationships and trust are outdated in that they do not reflect the multifaceted and multiplex nature of contemporary relationships or the compartmentalised and segmented reality of contemporary life.

Keeping in mind these three critical comments, we discuss our assumptions of trust, trustworthiness and contemporary relationships by way of analysing the Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model in the following section. As we stated above, we believe the Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) integrative trust model (hereafter, the Model) allows and indeed inspires researchers separately or simultaneously to study not only the overall level of trust in the relationship, but also domain-specific trust and trustworthiness in unfolding joint activities. However, to realise its fullest potential, the Model can benefit from further clarifications and modifications.
Critiques and extensions of Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model

Domain-specific trustworthiness and trust

The concept of domain-specific trust and trustworthiness is underdeveloped in the Model. Admittedly, the inclusion of ability trustworthiness as a trust antecedent, despite resistance from some researchers (e.g. Tinsley, 1996), is a significant breakthrough toward a theory of domain specific trust (Zand, 1972). In a multifaceted and multiplex relationship, one can trust a party in one area (e.g. career advice), but not another (e.g. marriage counselling). However, the domain specificity of trust is not explicit or apparent in the conceptions of integrity or benevolence. This begs the question: does a person’s trustworthiness vary across different domains for integrity and benevolence in the same way that it does across those for ability? It appears that the notion of domain specificity has different boundaries and meanings for the different trustworthiness dimensions. For ability, domain can refer to specific tasks such as the teaching, research and administrative responsibilities of a faculty member. For example, an academic colleague may be considered trustworthy in conducting high-quality research, but ineffective in the classroom. Alternatively for integrity, the relevant domain seems to refer to areas of conduct that reflect the moral character of the trustee, albeit as judged by the trustor. However, the relevant domain of moral conduct must be broader than in the case of ability. If a person’s moral conduct changes as frequently as his or her proficiency at specific tasks, he or she may be seen as morally capricious at best. Thus, we assert that the domain specificity of integrity refers to life domains such as private versus public life or business versus personal conduct (e.g. former president Bill Clinton). The domain concept of benevolence resembles that of integrity in many ways because in real life, as argued by Tinsley (1996), benevolence often carries ethical connotations. The key difference according to Mayer and colleagues (1995) is that benevolence refers to the quality of specific personal relationships, whereas integrity refers to adherence to acceptable principles. Therefore, the relevant domain for benevolence is the stage, type or nature of specific personal relationships. For example, people’s perceived benevolence can vary depending upon whether the relationship is in an early or mature stage of development (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), comprises interaction with in-group versus out-group others (Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002), or when there is shared versus non-shared social categories such as gender, race and ethnicity in the United States (Williams, 2001) or birth places, alma maters and comrades in arms in China (Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004).

In summary, to the extent that joint activities occur in different domains of tasks, private or business/public realms, or within various types of interpersonal relationships, individuals and their lives are multifaceted and complex enough to vary in their ability, integrity and benevolence trustworthiness. Therefore, to construct and claim a domain-specific trust model, the shape and nature of domains needs to be specified and differentiated across the three trustworthiness dimensions.

Relative importance and interrelationships among trustworthiness dimensions

Are the three trustworthiness dimensions equally important in contributing to trust assessment and decisions? Does trust in a joint activity have always to be built on all three dimensions or is one trustworthiness dimension sometimes sufficient? Answers
to these questions are important because they determine the utility of the Model for shedding light on the complex reality of contemporary life.

Mayer and colleagues (1995) did not explicitly address the issue of the relative importance of the three trustworthiness dimensions in the emergence of trust. However, with regard to the interrelationship, the authors clearly stated that ‘ability, benevolence, and integrity are important to trust, each may vary independently of the others’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 720), ‘act in a cumulative manner’, and ‘have an additive quality in determining the level of trust’ (Schoorman et al., 2007: 339). However, when illustrating the relationships among the three dimensions, the authors emphasised strong positive correlations, consistency and balance, rather than independence and variation. The mentor–protégé relationship example used by the authors strongly suggests that a mentor must be trustworthy in all three aspects of ability, integrity and benevolence. The authors consistently underscore the point that perceived ability alone ‘would not assure that the mentor would be helpful’, and ‘Integrity by itself will not make the individual a trusted mentor’, and even if the mentor’s ‘integrity is well known’ and ‘abilities are stellar’ the mentor may not be trusted because ‘this individual may have no particular attachment to the focal employee’ (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 721). In the example of a highly capable manager who repeatedly demonstrated strong benevolence to an employee, but who ‘does not demonstrate high integrity’, the authors retreat into ambivalence with a question, ‘can the employee help but wonder how long it will be until the manager betrays her or him as well?’ (1995, p. 721). The authors emphasised the necessity of demonstrating all types of trustworthiness in order to gain trust, even though they conceded that ‘there may be situations in which a meaningful amount of trust can develop with less degrees of the three dimensions’ (1995, p. 721). To us, the stated theoretical positions (that the trustworthiness framework is additive and that in certain situations not all dimensions must be simultaneously present for a party to trust another) were overshadowed, if not refuted, by the illustrative examples. For those who are familiar with the motivation literature, Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) stated model of trustworthiness is similar to the Job Characteristics Model (Hackman & Oldham, 1980), in which individual job characteristics additively contribute to employee work motivation, but Mayer and colleagues’ illustrative model is like the Expectancy Theory of Motivation (Vroom, 1964), the interactive model, in which expectancy (effort to performance expectation), instrumentality (performance to outcome expectation) and valence (value of the outcome) each must be greater than zero, otherwise there is no motivation.

While the requirement that all three trustworthiness dimensions be present for trust to exist might be logically sound and indeed be most preferable, it may not reflect how trust works in today’s workplace, as pointed out by Lewicki and colleagues (1998). A review of the trust literature shows three reasons why the three trustworthiness dimensions can act independently and why in many situations demonstrating a single trustworthiness dimension can be a sufficient ground for a trusting act. First, some trust researchers (e.g. Jones & George, 1998) propose that people initiate first encounters by suspending distrust so as to kick-start a positive exchange. Trust relationships among first encounters will never happen if neither party takes the initiative to perform a trusting act. There is, in fact, strong incentive to trust the other party even in the absence of sufficient positive information about the trustworthiness of the other party and such desire to perform ‘unwarranted’ trusting acts is even stronger if the trustor perceives greater dependence upon the
other party (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). To the extent that the initial trust is reciprocated by the trusted party, mutual trust develops and evolves into higher levels of trust. But even so, most relationships do not mature into perfect trust in which parties are considered highly trustworthy in all three dimensions. Jones and George (1998) call such imperfect trust relationships ‘conditional trust’ and Lewicki and colleagues (1998) call it ‘trust but verify’. Both types are said to represent the majority of relationships in today’s world.

Second, not all trustworthiness dimensions are equally critical in all situations. In seeking a speaker for an academic symposium on innovation and creativity, the most critical trustworthiness dimension is ability and knowledge. However, in seeking a member for a task force on resolving disputes between faculty members, the most critical trustworthiness dimension becomes neutrality and integrity.

Third, most trusting acts and relations do not occur in a vacuum, but are embedded in institutional contexts with various control mechanisms that allow members to take trustworthiness for granted (Lewicki et al., 1998). For example, the ability to provide developmental and constructive feedback from selected reviewers is generally assumed, but their willingness to do so is not. Therefore, trustors do not always feel the need to search and ascertain information along each trustworthiness dimension (even if they are critical) in order to decide whether or not to place trust in a given situation. In summary, for the above reasons, to engage in collaborative activities for mutual benefits, individuals often place trust in the other party with limited information in one or more trustworthiness dimensions.

**Trustworthiness in specific domains and trust in the total relationship**

For the Model to guide research on the dynamics of trust initiation, trust breaches, responses to trust initiatives or breaches, and the emotional experiences thereof, there is a need to break away from assessing a trustee’s general trustworthiness and a move towards assessing situated trustworthiness; that is, there is a need to examine the trustworthiness dimension most salient to a given joint activity. Only through variation of domains, whether it is the specific task, life aspects (e.g. personal versus professional life), or the nature or stage of a relationship, can variation and compartmentalisation be revealed instead of consistency and balance. To extend the Model into one that is truly domain specific, researchers need to conceive trust as attitudes, emotions and experiences played out in specific collaborative activities, tasks or situations (Jones & George, 1998; Lawler, 2001; Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005). Therefore, in this paper we theorise how reactions to specific trust breaches contribute to an overall trust adjustment in the relationship.

**The role of affect**

The role of affect is by and large absent in the Model (Schoorman et al., 2007). It is assumed that individuals cognitively assess multiple factors including words, deeds and situational contexts in assessing a party’s potential ability, integrity and benevolence, and make decisions as to whether or not to trust a party. Further, just as trust attitudes are a function of the cognitive assessment of trustworthiness, trusting behaviour is a function of cognitive decision whether or not to trust. Based upon outcomes, trustors re-evaluate their perceptions of trustworthiness in all dimensions, and make a cognitive decision to increase or decrease trust in the
relationship. Thus, consistent with the cognitive theme of trust and trustworthiness, the Model proposes a cognitive feedback loop from prior outcomes of trusting behaviours to subsequent perceptions of the trustee. From these cognitive processes trust and trustworthiness can be viewed in equilibrium when trustworthy actors are trusted and untrustworthy actors are not (McEvily et al., 2003).

In a way the absence of affect in the Model is consistent with the emphasis on the totality of the trustee and the totality of the relationship and with the coherence and equilibrium of the relationship among trustworthy dimensions. It is no coincidence that researchers adopting the situational approach to trust (e.g. Jones & George, 1998; Lawler, 2001) put affect right at the centre of their model to investigate how emotions influence and are influenced by their subjective experience of the process and outcome of collaborative activities.

In summary of the above analysis and for the purpose of the subsequent discussion, we make the following three broad assumptions about trust and trustworthiness.

**Assumption 1:** In joint activities, people are capable of initiating trust on the basis of little or limited trustworthiness information (e.g. only one dimension of trustworthiness).

**Assumption 2:** Trustworthiness of ability, benevolence and integrity are domain specific in that they vary across different tasks, different life domains, and different types of personal relationships respectively.

**Assumption 3:** Trustworthiness of ability, benevolence and integrity differentially contribute to trust in different situations.

The role of affect in trust and trust breach response

Because there is significantly less research examining the role of affect in trust relationships (Schoorman et al., 2007), the concept of affect is relatively less developed and studied within the trust literature than that of cognition. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper we draw from research in psychology to understand the nature and role of affect.

*Affect* is generally considered to be a superordinate construct that contains components of both moods and emotions (Barry & Oliver, 1996). *Moods* are usually recognised as relatively stable generalised feelings that are not identified with nor directed at any particular stimuli and are mild enough not to disrupt ongoing thought processes (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Frijda, 1993; Watson, 2000). On the other hand, *emotions* are defined as specific occurrences that are identified with or directed towards particular stimuli. They are relatively high in intensity and short in duration, and can provoke various cognitive appraisals (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005) or disrupt thought processes (Frijda, 1993; Forgas, 1992). In this work we refer to affect as emotions or feelings associated with a specific stimuli such as a person, a relation or an event rather than general moods.

Early trust researchers assumed that positive affect was an integral part of trust relationships (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). These scholars discussed trust relationships in terms of the overall structure and content of trust beliefs. The structure and content of trust beliefs, for example, includes which trustworthiness attributes are most salient, the domain within which the party is trusted or not, and the strength of the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Shapiro,
Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Generally these scholars relied upon a stage model of trust whereby overtime ‘affect influences higher stages or “deeper” levels of trust’ (Williams, 2001, p. 379). However, not all relationships progress to full maturity (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and, depending on the bases upon which trust is built, all mature relationships do not contain high levels of affect.

More recent work on affect has begun to examine specific situations in which affect serves as informational input to influence trust decisions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Williams, 2001, 2007), or situations in which affect is a reaction to particular actions of others (Dulac, Coyle-Shapiro, Henderson, & Wayne, 2008; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Williams, 2007). Following the new perspective of situational trust and applying Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) trustworthiness and trust model to specific collaborative activities (rather than total enduring relationships), we analyse the strength of the positive affect in the various trustworthiness dimensions and then theorise on how the breaching of different trustworthiness dimensions will lead to different levels, as well as different types of negative emotion, which in turn influence trust erosion and trust reparability (see Figure 1).

**Strength of positive affect in different trustworthiness dimensions**

Imagine that a person has had three successful collaborative activities with three different individuals, in all cases the focal person (the trustor) expects and experiences a high level of trust, but the bases of the trust, namely, the trustworthiness dimensions, differ in each case. In the first case, trust is based on the ability of the trustee, in the second on integrity and in the third on benevolence. Do we expect the affective content to be equally strong among the three types of trust relation? If not, which one or which combination is more or less affect-infused? In this work, we treat trustworthiness perception as the bases upon which trust judgement is made and we analyse each trust base separately by looking into perceived trustworthiness in selecting a partner prior to the joint activity as well as attributed trustworthiness to the partner after the successful completion of a joint activity.

**Affect in the perception and attribution of ability trustworthiness**

Of the three trustworthiness dimensions, the perception and attribution of ability is the most cognition-based (McAllister, 1995). In seeking and selecting an ability trustworthy partner, the trustor needs only to search for a potential trustee’s tangible record of prior performance without having to delve into extra information that can be affectively rich but cognitively irrelevant for the search task at hand. Thus, positive expectations about ability trustworthiness are less infused with affect because the target of assessment is predominantly the trustee’s relevant task.
performance. Accordingly, following a successful versus an unsuccessful joint activity, there will be some positive rather than negative feelings; and, to the extent that the success is partially attributed to the partner, it will cultivate an affective attachment to the partner (Lawler, 2001). However, as we argue below, the positive attachment resulting from an attribution of ability will be weaker than that from an attribution of integrity or benevolence. Finally, affective attachment to a partner is more likely to be produced to the extent that the collaborative activity requires high task interdependence. When collaborative tasks are separable and less interdependent, affective attachment is less likely to emerge (ibid.). In summary, we propose that ability-based trust, namely, trust based on ability trustworthiness expectation or attribution, is associated with less positive affect than the other two bases of trust.

Affect in perception and attribution of integrity trustworthiness

In seeking and selecting an integrity trustworthy partner, the track record of integrity is less tangible and available than that of either ability or benevolence, and most probably exists as reputation within a community. The focal person would have to search and recall his or her own personal experience as well as seeking others’ stories and testimonies of the potentially trusted party’s adherence to shared principles. The trustor also needs to assess the congruence between his or her own values and principles and those of the potential partner, which in itself is an affective process (Jones & George, 1998). If no such information is readily available, the trustor may infer value congruence from shared social identities such as race, gender, and age (Williams, 2001). Regardless of how the perception of integrity is derived, at the time when the partner is selected, positive expectations of integrity already carry a significant amount of positive affect. For example, positive expectations that a business partner will act in accordance with principles that are endorsed by the trustor create a sense of value congruence and identity (Jones & George, 1998). If integrity trustworthiness is attributed following a successful collaboration, the positive affect should also be stronger than that for ability, because an integrity attribution is imbued with more personal identification and evaluative content. Thus, trust based on integrity trustworthiness is associated with more positive affect than is ability-based trust.

Affect in perception and attribution of benevolence trustworthiness

In seeking and selecting a benevolent partner, a trustor searches for records or clues of goodwill and genuine care in the history of his or her personal interactions with a potential trustee. Such recall itself is primarily affective as it brings into memory pleasant and unpleasant experiences, instances of conflict of interests, solutions of compromise, consideration or even sacrifice. If there is no direct history of personal interaction, benevolent intentions may also be inferred from social identifiers associated with demographic and organisational social categories (Williams, 2001; Zucker, 1986). Therefore, the assessment of benevolence is inherently more affective because the target of assessment is the trustee in reference to personal motives, intentions and conflicts of interests between the two parties. Attributing a successful collaboration to the trustee’s benevolence rather than ability or integrity also carries stronger positive affect because of the particularistic consideration and care directed
toward the trustor by a benevolent trustee. The major difference between perception and attribution of benevolence versus integrity is that the focus of the former is the trustee’s personal and particularistic orientation toward the trustor, whereas the focus of the latter is the trustee’s adherence to a set of acceptable rules and principles, which are often institutionalised. Adhering to shared codes of integrity conduct is important to the social identity of the trustor, but, nevertheless, may not have as direct and immediate relevance to the welfare of the trustor as has benevolence. We therefore propose that benevolence-based trust contains more positive affect than either ability-based or integrity-based trust. In summary we propose:

**Proposition 1a:** Trust based on benevolence trustworthiness will be associated with stronger positive affect than trust based on integrity trustworthiness, which in turn will be associated with stronger positive affect than trust based on ability trustworthiness.

Although we argued that parties in joint activities can and do hold trust attitudes and perform trusting acts based upon the perception of a single trustworthiness dimension, we also recognise that trust built upon multiple trustworthiness dimensions may be more desirable. Following an additive and cumulative logic, the more trustworthiness bases, the greater aggregate level of positive affect associated with a person’s overall trustworthiness assessments. Furthermore, because there is a hierarchy of positive affect associated with the three trustworthiness dimensions (i.e. benevolence > integrity > ability), the total amount of affect will depend upon the specific combinations of the trustworthiness dimensions at play. For example, trust based upon the combination of benevolence and integrity will carry more positive affect than trust based on the combination of benevolence and ability. In any case, on the basis of simple mathematics, given the order of positive affect carrying capacity, we propose:

**Proposition 1b:** The aggregate trust based upon a benevolence-integrity combination will contain stronger positive affect than that of the benevolence-ability combination, which will contain stronger positive affect than that of the integrity-ability combination.

**Trust breach and erosion**

**Trust breach foci**

Many trust scholars use the term trust violation to refer to the actual acts by a trusted party that in some way do not meet the positive expectations of another party and trust -break, -erosion or -decline to refer to the reconsideration and decline in trusting beliefs in another (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Schoorman et al., 2007; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Drawing on the psychological contract literature, Dulac and colleagues (2008, p. 1080) use the term breach to refer to the cognition that a party has failed to fulfil an expectation and the term violation to refer to the ‘emotional distress and feelings of anger and betrayal’ arising from acts of trust breaches. Following Dulac and colleagues’ (2008) distinction between the cognitive awareness of an unfulfilled expectation and the emotional reactions to it, we use the term trust breach to mean the actions or withholding of actions on the part of the trustee that constitute a failure to fulfil the positive expectations of the trustor.

Trust breaches can be differentiated in at least two ways. One refers to the extent to which it damages the trustor’s well-being (Frijda, 1993; Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), and thus, the greater the negative consequence, the more severe the breach. The other way is to distinguish the focus of a particular breach (i.e. ability, integrity, or benevolence expectations). In this paper we concentrate on the focus of a particular breach and hold breach severity constant at the moderate level, assuming that the breach is consequential enough to cause some negative emotions. In the following, we discuss how the breaching of different trustworthiness expectations in a specific joint activity will have different effects on trust erosion.

Conceptions of trust erosion

In the trust research literature, trust break, erosion and decline are often used interchangeably as outcomes of a trust breach, which refer to the reconsideration of and reduction in either or both trust beliefs and behaviours (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Schoorman et al., 2007). In this paper, we prefer ‘trust erosion’ or ‘decline’ as they suggest a decrease in degree, whereas trust break carries a connotation of a binary choice or state of either staying in or completely withdrawing from the current trust relationship. Furthermore, previous research generally conceived trust erosion as the reduction of the level of trust (Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, & Szabo, 2007; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). For the purpose of the current paper, we adopted a more nuanced conception of trust erosion by further differentiating it into erosion depth and erosion breadth.

Trust erosion depth refers to the extent of the reduction of trust as a result of a trust breach. Trust erosion depth, often termed as trust decline, has attracted the most attention in trust theories and research (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Trust erosion breadth, on the other hand, refers to the extent that the erosion of trust spreads across different facets of a relationship, as opposed to focusing on a given facet. Relationship facets, defined narrowly, refer to the three trustworthiness dimensions upon which a trust relationship is built but, defined broadly, they include personal and professional aspects of a relationship. Trust breaches serve as ‘shocks’ that may potentially alter the underlying pattern and structure of the relationship and these shocks produce ‘aftershocks’ (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996, p. 43). These aftershocks occur as a trustor evaluates circumstances, makes attributions to the environment or trusted party, and renegotiates (or makes changes to) the relationship. For example, while trust may initially erode in a given trustworthiness dimension, concerns about the trustee’s trustworthiness may spread to other dimensions causing trust in the individual to erode across multiple facets and contexts. It is therefore important to distinguish whether trust erosion is contained in a specific dimension of the overall trust relationship or spreads to multiple dimensions of the relationship.

Trust grows, maintains or declines depending upon the extent to which a trustee lives up to a trustor’s positive expectations. In the case of a trust breach, assuming moderate trust breach severity, we argue that differences in trust breach foci (i.e. breach of different trustworthiness expectations) should have a significant impact on trust erosion depth and breadth. To start with, since different trustworthiness expectations and their combinations carry different amounts of positive affect as proposed in Propositions 1a and 1b, negative emotional responses to breaches of individual and combined expectations should vary accordingly. A trustworthiness
expectation or a combination of such expectations that carry the most positive affect, when breached, should arouse the strongest negative emotions when violated. The relative intensity of negative emotions post-breach should be in the same order as the positive affect in trustworthiness dimensions prior to the breach. In the following we support this argument by analysing self-identity threat and attributions of controllability and stability.

The self-concept is crucial to one’s interpretations of events and to the resulting emotions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). When an event contradicts assumptions that define one’s identity and values, the individual’s affective response is intense (Kelly, 1995). Such arguments have their origin in the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982), which proposes that the cognitive process of self- and social categorisation carries significant emotional connotation that biases individual’s cognition in the direction of enhancing and protecting one’s self- and social identification. Accordingly, Williams (2007) views trust breaches as damaging to a trustor’s self-identity, generating emotional experiences such as rejection and the denigration of positive self-attributes or self-images. In particular, when ability expectations are breached, it is less likely to harm the trustor’s self-identity than breach in expectations of integrity and benevolence, because the failure of the trustee to ably perform a joint task says more about the trustee’s ability in reference to the task than to the trustor’s self-identity (other than perhaps a misjudgement of ability). However, a breach of integrity expectations is more meaningful to a trustor’s personal self, since it violates one’s own principles of conduct that in part define self-identity and self-image. Finally, the breach of benevolence expectation represents the greatest threat to one’s self-identity because benevolence entails high relational identification with the trustee as well as trustor’s self-identification.

According the attribution theory (Weiner, 1986), salient negative outcomes such as a trust breach trigger attribution in terms of causality, controllability and stability. Causality refers to the ascription of internal versus external causes for a negative outcome. If the trustor believes that the cause of the negative outcome has nothing to do with the trustee’s ability, integrity or benevolence, then he or she would ascribe an external locus of causality to the negative outcome and there would be no negative emotions and no trust erosion. If, however, the negative outcome is ascribed to the internal attributes of the trustee, such as ability, integrity and benevolence, there still will be differences of controllability and stability in these internal attributions. As our focus in this paper is on the breach of positive expectations of trustworthiness, we limit our discussion to attribution of controllability and stability of the internal attributes of the trustee.

Controllability refers to the extent to which an internal cause, say ability, is under the volitional control of the actor. Controllability implies responsibility for the negative outcome. For example, attributing a breach to a controllable internal cause is more likely to cause negative emotions and trust erosion because the trustee is seen as responsible for bringing about the negative outcome, hence blameworthy. Stability refers to the degree to which the internal characteristic that causes the negative outcome is permanent, hence is more likely to cause future negative outcomes. Attributing a breach to a stable internal characteristic of the trustee is therefore more likely to cause negative emotions and trust erosion.

How do ability, integrity and benevolence breaches differ in terms of controllability and stability? According to Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) comprehensive analysis, aptitudes such as cognitive abilities, coordination and artistic abilities are
less controllable, while competences such as knowledge and skills are more controllable because they can be developed over time. In contrast, both integrity and benevolence are generally seen as more controllable by the trustee. As for stability, integrity is often considered more stable because of people’s belief that it emanates from a person’s character (i.e. the belief that once a liar always a liar) although we argued earlier that integrity may differ across life domains and personal relationships. Benevolence, according to Mayer and colleagues (1995) is more stable for developed relationships, but less so for new relationships, though we would add that group and network memberships can be seen as quite stable. Nevertheless, relative to integrity and benevolence, competences are considered to be malleable as they can be learned and trained. The attributional analyses suggest that a breach of benevolence or integrity expectations would yield stronger negative emotions than that of ability expectation. However, as argued earlier, the breach of benevolence expectations arouses stronger negative emotion than that of integrity expectations owing to the greater self-identity threat posed by the former than the latter. Combining the effects of negative emotions and internal causal attributions, we propose differential effects of trust breach foci on trust erosion as the following.

**Proposition 2a:** A breach of benevolence expectations will lead to deeper trust erosion than that of integrity expectations, which in turn will lead to deeper trust erosion than that of ability expectations.

Based on Proposition 2a and considering the case when there is a breach involving a combination of trustworthiness dimensions, we expect the following differences.

**Proposition 2b:** A breach of expectations of benevolence–integrity combination will lead to deeper trust erosion than that of benevolence–ability combination, which in turn will lead to deeper erosion than that of ability–integrity combination.

As we delineated earlier, while trust erosion depth refers to the magnitude of drop in the overall level of trust, trust erosion breadth deals with the spread of damage from one trust facet to other trust facets. We also underscored that the domain referent of trust breach for ability trustworthiness is the task, for integrity trustworthiness the character of the trustee in reference to a set of conduct principles, and for benevolence trustworthiness personal relationships. Accordingly, we believe that such differences in the meaning of domain have important implications to the spread of trust erosion. Damage to ability-based trust is more self-contained, not only to a specific task (to the extent that different tasks involve different capabilities), but also in the general task domain itself. In comparison, damages to integrity- and benevolence-based trust are more contagious because the breach of integrity expectations implicates a character flaw of the breacher and the breach of benevolence expectations suggests a disregard for the welfare of the trustor and the personal relationship. The difference between the effects of an integrity breach and a benevolence breach may be less remarkable as both have the potential to permeate into other facets of the relationship. However, consistent with our earlier argument that positive affect based on particularistic benevolence is stronger than that of integrity, we argue that a trust relationship is likely to weather the problems of an integrity breach as long as the trustor is convinced of the breacher’s benevolence trustworthiness. The opposite, however, is less likely for an integrity-based trust
relationship. When the breacher is believed to disregard the personal relationship or
the trustor’s well-being (e.g. a benevolence breach), perceived integrity trustworthi-
ness is likely to suffer as a result. In summary of the above arguments, a benevolence
breach has a broader devastating effect on the total relationship than an integrity
breach, which in turn has broader damage than does an ability breach. We therefore
propose that:

**Proposition 3a:** A breach of benevolence expectations will lead to broader trust erosion
than that of integrity expectations, which in turn will lead to broader trust erosion than
that of ability expectations.

**Proposition 3b:** A breach of expectations of benevolence-integrity combination will lead
to broader trust erosion than that of benevolence-ability combination, which in turn will
lead to broader erosion than that of ability-integrity combination.

### Mediation effects of specific negative emotions

In proposing the relationships between trust breach and trust erosion, we rely on the
arguments that the breach of different trustworthiness dimensions generates different
levels of overall negative emotions. Here, to shed light on the mediating mechanisms,
we theorise on how specific negative emotions may link a given breach to trust
erosion. Since our focus is on the specific mediating emotions, we will not make the
finer distinction between erosion depth and breadth.

Our review of the literature revealed two major ways of categorising emotions
that are relevant to our research and are highly respected within the field (for a
review, see Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010). One approach stems from works of
Darwin (1998 [1872]) and evolutionary psychologists (Epstein, 1984; Izard, 1977;
Plutchik, 1980). It posits that there exist a limited number of basic emotions innate to
human nature, which are physiologically hard-wired (Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1977), and
serve an important adaptation and survival function. Of the various negatively
valenced basic emotions, the following four commonly cited ones (Ekman, 1992;
Ortony & Turner, 1990; Plutchik, 1980) are: sadness, anger, fear and disgust.
Psychologically, these basic emotions serve as building blocks for the more complex
or ‘secondary’ emotions. According to this perspective, secondary emotions are
socially constructed ‘through the attachment of social definitions, labels, and
meanings to differentiated conditions of interaction and social organization’
(Kemper, 1987, p. 276). These emotions involve cognition, morality, knowledge,
experience and memory (Parrott, 2001). Examples of negatively valenced secondary
emotions include annoyance, fury, dislike, loathing, disappointment, apprehension,
fright, contempt, resentment, uncertainty and astonishment.

An alternative way of categorising emotions ignores the basic versus secondary
distinction, since, as some researchers point out, the basic emotion approach lacks
coherence and has produced mixed empirical support (Feldman Barrett, 2009;
Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989) categorised affect along two dimensions:
valence (pleasant–unpleasant feelings) and intensity (sleepiness–arousal). For
example, anger, which is a basic emotion according to Plutchik (1980), has a
negative valence and may vary ranging from low arousal in the form of annoyance to
high arousal in the form of fury. In this paper, which deals with negative emotional
reactions only, we integrate both approaches by identifying specific emotions as
provoked by trust breaches based on the valence-intensity affect circumplex model from Russell (1980, 1989), and match them onto the general basic emotions or their combinations as posited by Plutchik (1980).

The breaching of positive expectations of trustworthiness will generate unpleasant emotions across the different trust breach foci. However, due to the different nature of the trustworthiness expectations that have been breached, the more specific emotional reactions may have different roots in the basic negative emotions (that is, sadness, anger, fear and disgust as per Plutchik, 1980) and vary in the degree of emotional activation (that is, intensity as per Russell et al., 1989).

Consistent with our earlier analysis of the relative amount of affect in each trustworthiness dimension and the level of negative reaction to trust breach, we contend that, all else being equal and assuming a significant breach at the moderate level, a breach of ability expectations will provoke negative emotions at the lower to medium range of intensity, a breach of integrity expectations at the medium to high range of intensity, and a breach of benevolence expectations at the high range of intensity. Furthermore, applying Plutchik’s (1980) typology of basic emotions to the emotional reactions to trust breach foci in the following sections, we posited negative emotional reactions to ability breaches to be a combination of anger and sadness, those to integrity breaches a combination of anger, sadness and disgust, and those to benevolence breaches a combination of anger, sadness, and fear. These specific negative emotions will mediate between trust breach foci and trust erosion.

**Mediating emotions in ability expectation breaches**

When an ability expectation is breached, the trustor will probably experience specific emotions of disappointment, frustration and annoyance. The trustor is disappointed that the trustee could not be trusted in a particular activity, frustrated because his or her task achievement has been blocked, and annoyed because the trustee could have admitted low competence. Relating to Plutchik’s (1980) typology, these specific emotions fall into the basic emotions of anger and sadness and in terms of intensity, ‘disappointment’ ranks the lowest, while ‘annoyance’ the highest, with ‘frustration’ in between. The average negative emotions to the ability trustworthiness breach, however, are relatively milder than those to integrity and benevolence breaches because, as we argued earlier, ability-based trust is infused with the least affect and ability expectation breaches present the least threat to self-identity and self-image. Accordingly, we propose:

Proposition 4: The positive effect of an ability expectations breach on trust erosion is primarily mediated through negative emotions of disappointment, frustration and annoyance.

**Mediating emotions in integrity expectation breaches**

When integrity expectation is breached, of the various negative emotions identified by Plutchik (1980), the trustor will probably experience aversion, contempt and loathing. As argued in the prior sections, a breach of integrity expectation violates a trustor’s principles of conduct that in part define self-identity and self-image. Such breaches often involve attributions of responsibility and stability and moral judgement by which the trustor finds the trustee morally wrong, inferior, and
blameworthy (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). For example, Alberto Contador, a former team-mate of Lance Armstrong, and the champion of the 2010 Tour, was reportedly a great admirer of Armstrong for the latter’s athleticism, dedication and contribution to the Tour. However, apparently referring to Armstrong’s alleged use of performance-enhancing drugs, Contador expressed feelings of aversion and contempt claiming that ‘on the personal level ... I have never admired him and never will’ (Weber & Macur, 2010). Relating to Plutchik’s (1980) typology, these specific emotions fall into the basic emotions category of anger and disgust. Of the three negative emotions, ‘aversion’ ranks as the least strong in intensity, while ‘loathing’ is the most strong. The average amount of emotional reaction to the integrity expectation breach is relatively stronger than that to the ability expectation breach, but milder than that to the benevolence expectation breach, because integrity trustworthiness is infused with medium affect and integrity expectation breaches present a medium threat to self-identity and self-image. Accordingly, we propose:

**Proposition 5:** The positive effect of an integrity expectations breach on trust erosion is primarily mediated through negative emotions of aversion, contempt and loathing.

**Mediating emotions in benevolence expectation breaches**

When benevolence expectations are breached, as argued earlier, it creates the greatest threat to one’s self-identity and well-being, since benevolence entails high relational identification with the trustee, as well as the trustor’s own self-identification. Therefore, this type of breach can evoke basic emotions of sadness, anger, and/or fear, which can manifest themselves in high-intensity emotions of distress, despair and fury (Plutchik, 1980). The trustor is distressed not only because of the failure of the task accomplishment, but also due to the potential loss of close relationship, furious because of the perceived personal betrayal, and in the state of despair, if he or she anticipates the future potential damage to oneself. According to the emotion activation dimension in Russell’s (1980) circumplex mode of affect, ‘distress’ should be the lowest among the three in the intensity, as it is a derivative of sadness, followed by ‘despair’ (a mixture of sadness and fear) and followed by ‘fury’ – the highest intensity negative affect (Plutchik, 1980). Thus, the following is proposed:

**Proposition 6:** The positive effect of a benevolence expectations breach on trust erosion is primarily mediated through negative emotions of distress, despair and fury.

**Discussion**

In the past, trust researchers quite thoroughly examined trust evolution and repair processes (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Williams, 2001, 2007), but generally neglected the attributes of trust breaches and erosion. Moreover, with the majority in the field of trust research taking predominantly a cognitive approach (McEvily et al., 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007), some scholars have called for additional work on trust decline and repair, as well as the inclusion of affect in trust models (McEvily et al., 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007). To respond to these calls, in the present work we extend Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) well-established integrative model of organisational trust by (1) affirming the independent and additive effects of the three trustworthiness dimensions,
delineating the relative amount of positive affect associated with those trustworthiness dimensions, and (3) explicating domain specificity of not only ability, but also integrity and benevolence trustworthiness. We further explore how negative affective responses to a trust breach are tied to a particular trustworthiness expectation that has been breached and, going beyond the general negative feelings, we identified specific emotions associated with each trust breach focus. Finally, we proposed that the negative affective response to trust breach increases trust erosion in terms of depth and breadth.

We believe that the systematic examination of affect’s role in trust, trust breaches and erosion makes several important theoretical and research contributions to the trust literature. First, by extending the Mayer and colleagues’ (1995) model from trust in established stable relationships to episodes of trust in given joint activities, we de-emphasise the coherence and balance among the individual trustworthiness dimensions and render them more conducive to research that can explore their differential effects on trust building, trust breach and trust repair. Second, while previous theories and research on trust recognise the variation of affect in different types of trust relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Shapiro et al., 1992), we specify the relative levels of affect in perhaps the best-known framework of trustworthiness dimensions, namely ability, integrity and benevolence. This specification not only helps to predict and understand emotional reactions to trust breach, but also helps to understand the process of trust development, since different types of trustworthiness require differential kinds, as well as levels of social-emotional resources (Foa & Foa, 1980). Third, we explicitly explore both general negative affect and specific negative emotions as mediating mechanisms that link trust breach literature on one hand and trust erosion literature on the other (Frijda, 1993; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Williams, 2001, 2007). Research in this area will offer further insights into emotional mechanisms of trust decision.

Finally, our model complements and informs some existing perspectives and models of trust breach and repair. For example, the idea of a trust breach’s focus on different trustworthiness dimensions contributes to the attribution perspective. Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) suggest that external situations associated with various trustworthiness dimensions would influence a trustor’s attributions of cause to a trusted party. Other research has suggested that trust infused with positive affect would produce forgiving attributions (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Williams, 2001). Another natural research extension lies in trust repair. Obviously, the degree of trust erosion greatly influences trust repairability, that is, the deeper and the broader the trust erosion, the less reparable the trust is. Independently, however, there is a theoretical link between a trust breach’s focus and trust reparability. Trust repair faces a complicated and challenging process (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004) due to identity damages that engender negative emotions such as stress, anxiety and fear (Williams, 2007). People evaluate information differently depending on the focus of a trust breach. Specifically, Kim and colleagues (2004) compared the breach of ability expectations with that of integrity expectations and found that people tend to pay more attention to negative than to positive information when assessing integrity trustworthiness (e.g. Kim et al., 2004). In addition, Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow (2006) found in an experimental study that when trust was harmed by untrustworthy behaviour without deception, it could be successfully restored later by a series of consistent behaviours. However, when trust was broken by
untrustworthy behaviours and deception, it was never fully restored, even when the efforts of those who broke trust involved an apology, a promise and a series of consistent trustworthy behaviours. In line with these findings, Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) have found that ability-based trust was easily recovered when people admitted personal guilt; however, when people admitted personal guilt in the case of integrity-based trust, the recovery was more difficult. We add that the repair of a benevolence breach would be even harder than an integrity breach not only because of the particularistic personal nature of benevolence expectation, but also since it carries moral and ethical connotations (Tinsley, 1996).

For conducting empirical research, researchers might focus on the critical events of trusting decisions and trust breaches as a way to test some of the propositions presented here. For instance, experiments could manipulate the importance of different trustworthiness dimensions in a particular collaborative activity in which the trustor has to select partners. Initial affective attachment can be measured prior to or after successful completion of the joint activity to compare the differential effects of trustworthiness dimensions. Alternatively, experiments could manipulate different trustworthiness expectations and then observe emotional reactions to breaches of different expectations, as well as subsequent trust attitudes and behaviours. In non-experimental designs, researchers could ask participants to recall trust breach events, their immediate emotional experience of the breach events, and the relational outcomes of the events. Content analysis of the recalls could provide evidence for testing the relevant propositions.

In order to devote sufficient attention and space to the role of affect in various aspects of trust relationship dynamics, we found it necessary to simplify our model by assuming constancy in certain complex factors. In particular, we held trust breach severity to be moderately significant for all breach foci. However, earlier researchers (e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) suggested that trust breaches vary in severity, which has significant effect on trust decline and trust reparability. More conceptual work can be done on trust breach severity and on the separate and joint effects of trust breach severity and trust breach focus. It is possible that the differential effect of trust breach foci is largest when trust severity is moderately significant rather than extremely high. On the other hand, for a very severe trust breach that threatens the survival of the trustor (e.g. a trusted doctor’s incompetence causing serious medical injury), the relative difference in emotional reactions to the three trust breach foci would probably be reduced to low or non-significance.

We limit our analysis of trust breach attribution to controllability and stability not because we view causal attribution as irrelevant in trust breach, but because assuming internal attribution allows us more effectively to examine the effects of different trust breach foci on emotional responses. Furthermore, the perception of a particular trust breach foci may itself be subject to attribution. A trusted friend’s failure to offer requested help may be attributed to a breach of benevolence, but was in fact due to external circumstances or inability. Misattribution, therefore, is quite possible, which can be taken into account in the future for developing theory and conducting empirical research on trust breach.

We advocate a situational approach to the study of trust development, breach and repair. Such an approach in our view complements rather than refutes the traditional relationship approach. Except for the very first encounters, social interactions occur in a history of relationships. Erosion and reparability therefore do not occur as one-shot episodes, but rather, involve continuous give-and-take
exchanges and negotiations. One way of taking into account relationship history is to consider the cumulative influence of affective bonds in the relationship or the strength of positive expectations. It is possible that the existing affective bond or the strength of a positive expectation may exert main or interactive effects with trust breach foci on emotional reactions to trust breach (Pratt & Dirks, 2006).

Lastly, our exclusive devotion to the role of affect in trust breach responses and subsequent adjustments of trust have merits as well as downsides. Trust dynamics necessarily involve both affective and cognitive processes. Reasserting the role of affect is necessary for correcting deeply rooted biases in favour of cognition in the relevant literature, but to gain a full understanding of trust breaches and repair, there is a need for a theoretical model that incorporates emotional, cognitive and behavioural reactions to a trust breach to reveal the coexistence and the interplay of affective and cognitive processes.

In conclusion, although affect is an important and central part of human life (Panksepp, 2003), research exploring affect’s role in trust has been relatively limited (Schoorman et al., 2007). We believe that the model here represents preliminary steps to highlight affect’s role in all phrases and aspects of trust development and maintenance. We hope that it will stimulate more theory and research that simultaneously explore the independent and interactive effects of affect and cognition on the processes and outcomes of trust, trust breach, trust erosion and repair.

Notes on contributors

Chao C. Chen is Professor of Management and Global Business, Rutgers University. His research interests include rewards and compensation, organisational justice, leadership, networking, trust and cross-cultural management. He has published in leading management journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, and Organization Science. Email: chaochen@business.rutgers.edu

Patrick A. Saparito received his Ph.D. in Strategic Management from Rutgers University in Newark, NJ. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship and Director of the Family Business and Entrepreneurship Program at the Haub School of Business at Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His primary line of research is trust and inter-firm relationships. His approach to this line of research is to extend organisation economics models through the inclusion of sociological variables, or offer parallel frameworks from a social-psychological perspective. His second research stream investigates the financing of emerging and small firms. His research appears in the Academy of Management Journal, IEEE Transaction and Engineering Management, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Management, and Venture Capital. Email: psaparit@sju.edu

Liuba Y. Belkin is Assistant Professor of Management at Lehigh University, College of Business and Economics, USA. Her primary research interests are on affect and emotions in organisational settings. Specifically, she studies the role of emotions in trust relationships, in individual ethical/moral reasoning, as well as in negotiation and decision-making contexts. She also studies the influence of electronic communication media on employee perceptions, relationships and performance. Her articles have been published in various academic journals, including Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of International Business Studies and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, among others. Email: lyb207@lehigh.edu
References


